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"The strongest presumption of the law is the presumption of 
legitimacy."! 
"No human bond is cemented with greater strength than that of 
parent and child."2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At common law, a man had no duty to support his illegitimate 
child. 3 While the law required a father to provide for his legitimate 
issue, it regarded an illegitimate child as filius nullius, "the child of no 
one."4 Over time, the common law was gradually supplanted by stat­
utes enacted to provide for adjudication of paternity.s 
Legislatures passed such statutes in order to enable mothers to 
compel putative fathers to appear in court to prove that these errant 
men were the fathers of their illegitimate children and therefore re­
sponsible for child support.6 The legislatures, and indeed society, ap­
1. Thompson v. Nichols, 286 A.D. 810, 810, 141 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (1955) (where 
mother and husband were living in the same apartment at the times of conception and birth 
ofa child, evidence of paternity in another man was not sufficient to overcome the strongest 
presumption of the law, the presumption of legitimacy); Burnes v. Burnes, 60 Misc. 2d 675, 
676,303 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (1969) (because presumption ofiegitimacy is one of the strong­
est presumptions of law, a married woman's action to have a man other than her husband 
declared the father of her child must be adjourned to permit notice to the mother's hus­
band, the presumed father). 
2. Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 216 Cal. Rptr. 748,749,703 P.2d 88, 89 (1985) (where 
the mother and husband were divorced and mother subsequently married the man who 
claimed to be the natural father of the child, born during her earlier marriage, the presump­
tion of paternity in the man who was the mother's husband at the time of birth was not 
overcome), appeal dismissed, Michelle Marie W. v. Riley, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986). 
3. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 5.1, 
at 155 (1968); G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW § 3.7, at 143 
(1979); H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1971). 
4. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 155; H. KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 3-5. 
5. For examples of such statutes, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West 1983) (originally 
enacted as Stats. 1921 c. 136, p. 137, § 1 (1921); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1354 (Smith­
Hurd 1980) (originally enacted as Family Court Act of 1899); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT 5 
§ 522 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (amending N.Y. CITY CRIM. CT. ACT § 62 (McKinney 
1930) and N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 120 (McKinney 1925»; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
52-435 (West 1960) (originally enacted as Gen. Assembly Public Statute Laws, Stat. 92, tit. 
8, § 1-3, (1672) appearing in Stat. 92 Title 8 § 1-3 Fn3, General Assembly Public Statute 
Laws, May Session 1821) (repealed 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 71 (West 1966 & 
Supp. 1985) (originally enacted as Compo Laws Dak. § 5560 (1887». 
6. In Commonwealth v. Domes, 239 Mass. 592, 132 N.E. 363 (1921), the Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court explained the purpose of the Massachusetts statute: 
. . . [T]he purpose of our bastardy laws is to secure the municipality or state 
against any loss or expense for the child's maintenance. . . . It is true that his­
torically legislation of this character is connected with the system of poor relief; 
there being no legal obligation on the putative father to support his illegitimate 
child at common law.... Apparently the main object of such legislation has 
been to provide security for the town liable to support the bastard child. This was 
231 1986] PUTATIVE FATHERS 
parently never contemplated that a day would come when men 
themselves would seek to establish paternity, when a man would want 
to compel a woman into court to prove that he was the father of the 
woman's child. Today, after more than two decades of profound 
changes in social attitudes toward sex roles, which have included a 
new appreciation of men as parents and nurturers, that day has come. 
In the recent Massachusetts case of P.B. C. v. D.H., after a di­
vorced woman had given birth to a child, the man with whom the 
woman had had a sexual relationship prior to her pregnancy and di­
vorce sought a judicial determination that he was the father of the 
child.7 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, relying on the 
deeply entrenched common law presumption that the husband of a 
married woman is the father of her child,8 dismissed the putative fa­
ther's9 suit.1O The court held that as a stranger to the marriage the 
putative father had no right to attempt to rebut the presumption of 
paternity in the mother's husband. I I 
This note will examine a putative father's right to prove paternity 
in the context both of the supreme judicial court's decision in P.B. C. 
and the existing common law and statutory remedies available to puta­
tive fathers in Massachusetts. Part II of the note will both set out the 
facts of P.B. C. and analyze the court's holding and reasoning in that 
emphasized after St. 1859, c. 239, gave substantial control of the litigation to the 
overseers of the poor in the town of the complainant's residence. But both before 
and after that statute was enacted, another recognized purpose was to compel the 
putative father to aid the mother in the support of the child. 
Id. at 593-94, 132 N.E. at 364. 
7. P.B.C. v. D.H., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. 68,483 N.E.2d 1094 (1985), cert. denied, 106 
S. Ct. 1286 (1986). 
8. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 156 (discussion of the history of this presumption). 
Clark explains that at English common law 
[a] strong presumption [existed] that the child born to a married woman was 
legitimate.... [A]t one point in English legal history it could be rebutted only 
by proof that the mother's husband was impotent or out of England. In the color­
ful legal phrase he had to be proved to be 'beyond the four seas.' The presump­
tion survives in our law .... 
See also Commonwealth v. Leary, 345 Mass. 59,185 N.E.2d 641 (1962) (the legal presump­
tion always is that a child born in lawful wedlock is legitimate, but such presumption may 
be rebutted by facts which prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the mother's husband 
could not have been the father of her child); P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d 
at 1096. 
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979) defines putative father as "the 
alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child." The term "putative father," as used in 
this note, shall refer to a man who has asserted his biological paternity of a child, but who 
has not been adjudicated to be the legal father of the child. 
10. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68, 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1095, 1098-99. 
11. Id. at 71-72, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
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case. Part III will assess how M~ssachusetts law affects a putative 
father's guarantee of equal protection under the fourteenth amend­
ment to the United States Constitution. 12 In this section the note will 
demonstrate how Massachusetts classifies putative fathers in a way 
that burdens their right to establish a paternal relationship.13 Part IV 
of the note will argue that that right is a fundamental right. Part V 
will apply a strict scrutiny analysis to illustrate how Massachusetts 
law violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu­
tion. In Part VI the note will argue, in the alternative, that if the right 
of fathers to establish a parent-child relationship is not a fundamental 
right, the Massachusetts scheme nonetheless fails under a less rigorous 
rational basis analysis. The note concludes that under the equal pro­
tection clause of the United States Constitution, Massachusetts law 
impermissibly burdens a putative father's right to prove his paternity 
of his child. 
II. FACTS 
P.B. C. involved a paternity suit brought under the equity jurisdic­
tion of the probate and family court14 by a man unmarried to the 
12. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: 
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
13. By right to establish a paternal relationship, this note refers to the right of a man 
to have access to the courts to prove his biological paternity. The mere establishment of 
that relationship is the right denied to the plaintiff in P.B. C. and it is, therefore, that bare 
right that is the focus of this note. Of course, from that adjudication of paternity may flow 
other rights, such as custody and visitation, if the granting of such rights is found to be 
consistent with the child's best interests. See infra note 143. 
14. Chapter 215, section 6 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides for the eq­
uity jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court: 
The probate and family court department shall have original and concurrent ju­
risdiction with the supreme judicial court and the superior court department of 
all cases and matters of equity cognizable under the general principles of equity 
jurisprudence and, with reference thereto, shall be courts of general equity 
jurisdiction. . . . 
In Normand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 434 N.E.2d 631 (1982), where a putative father 
invoked this equity jurisdiction, the supreme judicial court explained that 
[w]here a man is acknowledged to be the father of an illegitimate child, the Pro­
bate Court has jurisdiction under G. L. c. 215, § 6, first par. (conferring equity 
jurisdiction), to make judgments concerning the father's visitation rights. . . . 
[W]here the plaintiff's paternity is denied or questioned, the court has jurisdiction 
to determine that issue, and, if paternity is established, to determine what, if any, 
rights of visitation the plaintiff should have. 
[d. at 851-53,434 N.E.2d at 632-33. 
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child's mother. IS The mother of the child, who was the defendant in 
the case, had given birth to the child the day after she was divorced 
from her husband. 16 Plaintiff sought a decree that he, and not the 
former husband, was the father of the child. 17 
The child whose paternity was at issue in P.B. C. was conceived in 
September 198118 and was born on June 10, 1982.19 The putative fa­
ther and the mother agreed that they had engaged in a sexual relation­
ship prior to September 198120 but disputed whether that relationship 
continued during and after September 1981.21 
In May 1981, five months before the child was conceived, the 
mother filed a complaint for divorce from her husband.22 The probate 
and family court entered a judgment of divorce nisp3 in December 
1981, and the divorce became final on June 9, 1982, the day before the 
child's birth.24 On September 12, 1983, six days after the putative fa­
ther filed suit for adjudication of paternity, the mother and her former 
husband remarried.2s The mother, her husband, an older child previ­
ously born to them, and the child at the center of this controversy 
continued to live together at the time of the supreme judicial court's 
decision.26 
The child involved in the case has resided with the mother since 
birth,27 and the husband, who is listed as the father on the child's birth 
certificate, has not taken any legal steps to deny paternity.28 The puta­
tive father's relationship with the child for the first fifteen months of 
his life is unc1ear;29 however, beginning in September 1983, the mother 
15. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
16. Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
17. Id. at 68-69, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
18. Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Plaintiff claimed that the sexual relationship between he and the defendant con­
tinued during September, October, and November, 1981. Defendant asserted that their 
sexual activity had ceased prior to September. Id. at 70 n.l, 483 N.E.2d at 1096 n.1. 
22. Id. 
23. Divorce nisi is an interim judgment of divorce. The supreme judicial court has 
explained that "[A] judgment nisi is a judgment of divorce ... a couple is not divorced 
until the judgment becomes absolute ... [t]hus, a second marriage contracted during the 
interval between the judgment nisi and the judgment absolute is void." Ross v. Ross, 385 
Mass. 30, 35, 430 N.E.2d 815, 819 (1982). 
24. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 70-71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
27. Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
28. Id. 
29. Because plaintilrs suit was dismissed before trial, the court made no findings as 
to the putative father's relationship to the child during his first fifteen months of life. The 
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denied him visitation or other access to the child. 30 That denial 
prompted the putative father to file suit in probate court to have him­
self declared the father of the child. 
The putative father moved for a court order that he, the mother, 
and the child submit to a Human Leukocyte Antigen white blood cell 
test. 31 Upon a denial of this motion, the putative father instituted pro­
ceedings in the appeals court and before a single justice of the supreme 
judicial court, and an order for the requested test on a specified date 
was issued. 32 
The mother and child failed to submit to the test, however, and 
the trial court imposed sanctions that would have had the effect of the 
plaintiff's attorney explained that the mother had approached P.B.C. when the child was 
born, asserting that he was the baby's father and requesting financial assistance as well as 
help in caring for the child. The plaintiff then supplied his home with baby-care furniture 
and equipment, including a crib, and cared for the child during the week while the mother 
worked at an evening shift job. The plaintiff also made payments on a home in which the 
mother and child lived. Telephone interview with Muriel Carpenter, attorney for the plain­
tiff in P.D.C., (December 6, 1985). 
The defendant's attorney, on the other hand, explained that his client denied that the 
plaintiff was the father of the child. Although defendant admitted that she had had an 
affair with the plaintiff, she maintained that she had terminated that involvement prior to 
the child's birth. She further denied that the plaintiff provided housing for herself and the 
baby, and instead asserted that she merely rented an apartment in a house which he owned. 
Telephone interview with Steven Dean, attorney for the defendant in P.D.C., (January 7, 
1986). 
30. P.D.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
31. Id. at 69,483 N.E.2d at 1095. The Massachusetts legislature has recognized the 
reliability and accuracy of blood tests as a method of determining paternity. Chapter 273, 
section 12A of the Massachusetts General Laws provides for the court to order blood tests 
in paternity proceedings: 
In any proceeding to determine the question of paternity, the court, on the mo­
tion of the alleged father, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father 
to submit to one or more blood grouping tests, to be made by a duly qualified 
physician or other duly qualified person, designated by the court, to determine 
whether or not the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child. 
The results of such tests shall be admissible in evidence only in cases where defi­
nite exclusion of the alleged father as such father has been established. If one of 
the parties refuses to comply with the order of the court relative to such tests, 
such fact shall be admissible in evidence in such proceeding unless the court, for 
good cause, otherwise orders. 
See Commonwealth v. Blazo, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 324,406 N.E.2d 1323 (1980) (in view of 
the high level of accuracy attained from human leukocyte antigen white blood cell test and 
the recognition and acceptance of the test by the scientific and medical communities, order 
for such test should be seriously considered in a paternity proceeding). 
32. P.D.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 69, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. The opinion is unclear 
about whether the order for the blood test was issued by the trial court, the appeals court, 
or the supreme judicial court: "there were proceedings in the Appeals Court and before a 
single justice of this court, as well as further proceedings in the trial court, resulting in the 
allowance of the plaintifrs motion." Id. 
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mother's making concessions favorable to the putative father's claim.33 
When the putative father moved that the case be scheduled for trial, 
the mother responded with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the 
putative father could not litigate the issue of paternity.34 The trial 
court denied this motion, and ordered that noncompliance with the 
order for the blood test would result in the mother's incarceration, 
assessment of daily costs against her, and preclusion of her offering 
evidence on the issue of paternity.35 
The mother then petitioned the appeals court for review of the 
denial of her motion to dismiss the putative father's complaint.36 A 
single justice of the appeals court authorized an interlocutory appeal 
to the appeals court from the denial of her motion to dismiss and 
stayed the proceedings in the trial court.37 The supreme judicial court 
transferred the case on its own initiative. 38 
Pointing to dual policies of avoiding illegitimacy and protecting 
family life, the supreme judicial court granted the mother's motion to 
dismiss.39 The court cited the firmly established rule that a child born 
to a married woman is presumed to be the child of her husband,40 and 
then, because the mother was not married but divorced at the time the 
child was born, extended that presumption to include a child conceived 
by a married woman.41 While acknowledging that the presumption of 
legitimacy could be rebutted by a mother or her husband,42 the court 
held that the presumption was irrebuttable by a putative father.43 
Plaintiff was therefore not allowed to introduce any evidence to prove 
that he was the father of the child, and the court refused to hear his 
claim for paternity adjudication.44 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 69-70, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
38. Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
39. Id. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99. 
40. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
41. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
42. Id. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. See also Symonds v. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, 
544,432 N.E.2d 700, 703 (1982), stating that "[t]he Legislature has authorized a husband 
and a wife to testify in a nonsupport action concerning the parentage of a child (G. L. c.273 
§ 7) and has allowed a mother, although married, to testify in an illegitimacy proceeding 
that a man other than her husband is the father of her child."}. 
43. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99. 
44. After this decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court which denied 
certiorari on March 3, 1986. P.B.C. v. D.H., 106 S. Ct. 1286 (1986). 
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II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF PARENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
The Supreme Court of the United States has read the equal pro­
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con­
stitution to require that, at a minimum, a governmental classification 
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.45 Where a classifica­
tion affects a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class, however, a 
court subjects it to strict judicial scrutiny and must determine that it is 
the narrowest way to achieve a compelling state end.46 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in P.B. C, 
read against the backdrop of the statutory and common law rules re­
garding paternity in Massachusetts,47 operates to classify men as 
either presumed or putative fathers48 and, in so doing, to deny putative 
fathers the right to prove that they are the fathers of their children.49 
That right, implicating a core relationship between parent and child, is 
a fundamental right. 50 
Massachusetts paternity law views married men as the presumed 
fathers of children born to their wives. 51 That same presumption op­
erates to render an unmarried putative father's ability to prove that he 
is the biological father of a married woman's child difficult, if not im­
possible.52 The putative father does not enjoy the benefit of a pre­
sumption of paternity, and if the mother of the child is married, he 
must rebut the presumption of paternity in her husband. As the note 
will demonstrate, the legal avenues available to a Massachusetts puta­
tive father to establish his paternity of a married woman's child are 
quite limited. 
The effect of Massachusetts paternity law is to classify fathers and 
45. In City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-55 
(1985), the Court stated that the general rule regarding the validity of state legislation 
under equal protection is that such validity is presumed and the law will be sustained if the 
classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. When economic legislation 
is at issue, the Court has generally shown a deferrential attitude. See, e.g., Schweiker v. 
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v. 
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
46. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
47. See infra notes 51-96 and accompanying text. 
48. Although mothers constitute another class of parents, a full discussion of the 
rights and duties of mothers, is outside the scope of this note. For a discussion of maternal 
rights see H. CLARK, supra note 3, § 5.4, at 176-77; G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED 
COUPLES AND THE LAW § 3.6, at 138 (1979); H. KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 28-29. 
49. See infra notes 66·96 and accompanying text. 
50. See infra notes 101-166 and accompanying text. 
51. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
52. See infra notes 66·96 and accompanying text. 
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then to give more rights to presumed than to putative fathers. Such a 
classification triggers the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 53 
Massachusetts' interest in the classification is three-fold: (1) to 
make children legitimate wherever possible; (2) to protect traditional 
family units; and (3) to ensure the care and support of children.54 The 
state classification system affords legitimacy to the greatest number of 
children through its preference that paternity reside in married rather 
than unmarried men. It protects traditional family units by erecting 
barriers to an unmarried, putative father's ability to disrupt an intact 
family unit through his attempts to prove that he is the father of a 
child conceived or born during the marriage. Finally, the state classifi­
cation system ensures the care and support of children by guarantee­
ing that at least one man will be presumed to be the legal father of a 
child. 
This section of the note will examine the classification of parents 
in Massachusetts, whereby putative fathers are granted rights inferior 
to presumed fathers. In the next section the note will demonstrate 
how the right burdened by the classification, the right of a man to 
establish a parent-child relationship, is a fundamental right. 
A. The Rights of Married Fathers 
The law presumes a man to be the father of a child born to his 
wife. 55 No legal proceedings are required to establish a husband's pa­
ternity; the presumption of legitimacy operates automatically to make 
53. The Equal Protection Clause is triggered by a classification that operates to dis­
tinguish between groups of persons who are similarly situated, and then gives more rights 
to one group than to another. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts 
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives only to unmarried persons violates 
equal protection). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (prohibiting the sale of 
3.2% beer to males under 21 and to females under 18 violates equal protection); Levy v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (denying illegitimate children the right to recover for the 
wrongful death of their mother while permitting recovery for legitimate children in the 
same circumstance violates equal protection). For a general discussion of classifications 
triggering equal protection see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586-686 (11th ed. 
1985). 
54. In P.B.C the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stressed the primacy of 
these interests. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1099. 
55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In P.B.C the court expressly stated 
this presumption, and then declared that the "presumption of legitimacy may not be rebut­
ted, even in a civil case, 'except on facts which prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the 
husband could not have been the father.''' P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d 
at 1096 (quoting Phillips v. Allen, 2 Allen 453, 454 (1861». See also Sayles v. Sayles, 323 
Mass. 66, 80 N.E.2d 21 (1948) (mere proof of the wife's adultery while cohabiting with her 
husband is not sufficient to overcome presumption of legitimacy). 
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the husband of the mother the legally recognized father of a child born 
to her.56 The husband, accordingly, is both responsible for the child's 
support and entitled to constitutional protection of the resulting par­
ent-child relationship. 57 
This presumption of legitimacy has its roots in the societal and 
religious condemnation of out-of-wedlock sexual activity, condemna­
tion which was visited on the child born of such activity as well as on 
the parents. The plight of the "bastard" child centuries ago provided 
56. Because of the strength of the presumption, a husband is legally the father of any 
child born to his wife unless and until the presumption has been formally rebutted. See 
supra note 8. Thus, an unmarried man must establish that he is the father of a child, while 
a married man must establish that he is not. 
57. A father's duty to support his children derives from chapter 273 section 1 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws which makes desertion and nonsupport a crime, providing in 
part that: 
Any spouse or parent who without just cause deserts his spouse or minor child, 
whether by going into another town in the commonwealth or into another state, 
and leaves them or any or either of them without making reasonable provision for 
their support, and any spouse or parent who unreasonably neglects or refuses to 
provide for the support and maintenance of his spouse, whether living with him 
or living apart from him for justifiable cause, or of his minor child, and any 
spouse or parent who abandons or leaves his spouse or minor child in danger of 
becoming a burden upon the public and any parent of a minor child or any guard­
ian with care and custody of a minor child, or any custodian of a minor child, 
who willfully fails to provide necessary and proper physical, educational or moral 
care and guidance, or who permits said child to grow up under conditions or 
circumstances damaging to the child's sound character development, or who fails 
to provide proper attention for said child, shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or 
both. 
See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979) (parents are natural 
guardians of their children with legal as well as moral obligation to support, educate, and 
care for their children's development and well-being, and, as such, it is parents who have 
the primary right to raise their children as they see fit); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 
Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971) (the law gives parents custody and right of control over 
their children, including power to exercise whatever authority is reasonably necessary for 
that purpose to enable them to discharge their obligation to support, provide for and pro­
tect their children and to provide educational guidance); Commonwealth v. Zarrilli, 5 
Mass. App. Ct. 518, 364 N.E.2d 1089 (1977) (husband has a duty to support his wife and 
minor children). 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a parent-child relationship is enti­
tled to constitutional protection. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("It is 
plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of 
his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when 
appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.' " 
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring»; Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."). 
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the impetus for the presumption of legitimacy.58 By preventing mar­
ried couples from bastardizing their own issue, even where adultery 
may have occurred, the law minimized the number of illegitimate chil­
dren. Two factors were at work. First, the harsh treatment of illegiti­
mates provided motivation for the law to operate so as to avoid 
attaching illegitimate status to innocent children whenever possible. 59 
Second, the lack of any method of determining paternity as conclusive 
as modern blood testing was a logical reason for presuming paternity 
in a husband. 60 
A hypothetical situation illustrates the operation of the presump­
tion of legitimacy. If a married woman (W) conceives a child (C), her 
husband (H) is presumed to be the father of that child. That presump­
tion applies whether or not H is indeed C's biological father,61 whether 
or not Hand W were divorced at the time of C's birth,62 whether or 
not they subsequently divorce,63 and even whether or not H has any 
relationship with or emotional tie to C whatsoever.64 For example, if 
during the pregnancy Hand W divorce, W alone moves to a distant 
city, gives birth there, and the ex-husband does not ever see or even 
58. H. CLARKE, supra note 3, at 155-56,172; H. KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 1-7. See 
also Note, Recent Decisions-Domestic Relations, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 129 (1970). 
59. H. CLARKE, supra note 3, at 172. 
60. H. KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 123. 
61. This, of course, is the issue in P.B. C. Because the court presumed the mother's 
husband to be the father of her child and wished to shield the marriage from paternity suits 
brought by outsiders, the court refused to inquire into the actual biological paternity of the 
child by means of a blood test. Some courts have refused to relieve husbands from a pre­
sumed fatherhood status even in the presence of evidence which clearly establishes that 
biological paternity does not lie in the husband. See. e.g., Cook v. Perron, 427 So. 2d 499 
(La. Ct. App. 1983) (husband precluded from disavowing child notwithstanding blood tests 
conclusively showing that he could not have been the biological father of the child); People 
v. Thompson, 89 Cal. App. 3d 193, 152 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1979) (husband is deemed legal 
father of and is responsible for his wife's child if it is conceived while they are cohabiting, 
and the issue of biological paternity is irrelevant); Hess v. Whitsett, 257 Cal. App. 2d 552, 
65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967) (racial differences do not overcome the presumption of legitimacy; 
where white wife was married to white husband but gave birth to a Negro/white mixed­
race child, husband still held to be the father of the child). 
62. In P.B.C., the husband and wife were divorced at the time of the child's birth. 
1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. See also Cartee v. Carswell, 425 So. 2d 
204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (a child born after a divorce but conceived during marriage 
is presumed legitimate and thus the ex-husband is presumed to be the father). 
63. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096; Michelle W. v. Ronald 
W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985) (presumption oflegitimacy not 
overcome even when mother remarries after divorce), appeal dismissed, Michelle Marie W. 
v. Riley, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986). 
64. See Lirette v. Lirette, 430 So. 2d 1150 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (former husband was 
presumed to be the father of child born to his former wife, even though she committed 
adultery and then concealed her pregnancy and the fact of the child's birth from him). 
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meet the child, the law would nevertheless presume him to be the fa­
ther of that child.65 
B. The Rights of Putative Fathers 
In contrast to a married man, a putative father is not presumed to 
be the father of a child. A putative father must affirmatively establish 
his paternity, rather than merely relying. on the operation of a 
presumption. 
This section of the note will describe the ways in which putative 
fathers in Massachusetts may establish paternity and will show how 
the circumstance of the mother's marriage and the resulting presump­
tion of legitimacy preclude the putative father from access to any of 
the state-provided alternatives. 
1. Marriage to the Child's Mother 
The first way in which a putative father can establish paternity of 
his child is to marry the child's mother. If the marriage takes place 
prior to the birth of the child, the presumption of legitimacy operates 
to make the husband the presumed father of the child born to his wife, 
whether or not the couple was married at the time the child was 
conceived.66 
Marriage to the mother, without more, is not sufficient to estab­
lish paternity in Massachusetts when the marriage takes place after the 
child is born.67 If the new husband does not acknowledge68 the child 
as his own, then paternity is neither established nor presumed solely 
by virtue of the marriage, and a stepfather-stepchild relationship ex­
ists. If, however, marriage is accompanied by the new husband's ac­
knowledgment of his paternity of his wife's child, then Massachusetts 
law recognizes the husband as the child's father.69 
The problem with this method of securing parental rights is two­
fold. First, even if the putative father is willing to marry the child's 
mother, she may already be married, or she may not be willing to 
65. Id. 
66. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text. 
67. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West 1958) (amended by ch. 190, § 7 
(West Supp. 1986». In 1929, the Massachusetts Attorney-General addressed the question 
whether "the subsequent marriage of the parents of a child born out of wedlock has the 
effect of legitimating their child." The Attorney-General advised that acknowledgement by 
the father was "requisite in addition to intermarriage to legitimate a child born out of 
wedlock." 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 355 (1927). 
68. See infra note 72. 
69. See infra note 72. 
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marry him. In these situations, whether or not the putative father will 
be able to establish a parent-child relationship will depend wholly on 
the status and will of the mother. The United States Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that this method of securing a parent-child relation­
ship, depending as it does on the will of the mother, is not within the 
putative father's controPo It is not, therefore, a particularly effective 
remedy for the putative father. 
Second, even if the mother marries the putative father after the 
child's birth, if she was married to another man at the time of the 
child's conception or birth, then the presumption of paternity rests 
with the former husband. That presumption would not be voided by 
the mother's later marriage to the third party.7 1 In other words, mar­
riage to the mother will transform a putative father into a presumed 
father only if the mother was not married to anyone else at the time 
the child was conceived or born. 
In the situation of the putative father in P.B. C, the defendant 
mother was divorced at the time of the child's birth, and marriage 
between her and the putative father was thus theoretically possible. 
Even if both parties had agreed to the union, however, it would not 
have achieved the goal of establishing the putative father's paternity, 
because the presumption of paternity would have remained with the 
ex-husband. 
Thus, where the parties are unable or unwilling to marry, or 
where the presumption of legitimacy has already named the mother's 
former husband as the child's father, this method of establishing pater­
nity fails. 
2. Acknowledgment of the Child 
The second way in which a putative father may establish pater­
nity of his child is to "acknowledge" the child as his.72 Massachusetts 
70. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983). 
71. Michelle w., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748. 
72. Massachusetts courts have uniformly held that acknowledgment of a child con­
fers legitimacy on that child. See, e.g., MacIntyre v. Cregg, 350 Mass. 22, 212 N.E.2d 860 
(1965) (child born illegitimate whose parents later intermarried and whose father acknowl­
edged him as his became legitimate under chapter 190, section 7 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws even though the child's birth record was not amended under chapter 46, 
section 13 of the Massachusetts General Laws); Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 405 
N.E.2d 135 (1980) (requirement of intermarriage to legitimate a child under chapter 190, 
§ 7 is unconstitutional; statutory requirement of acknowledgment and/or adjudication of 
paternity is constitutional). The fact of the child's legitimacy neccessarily implies that the 
putative father is now presumed to be the actual father of the child. See Houghton v. 
Dickinson, 196 Mass. 389, 392, 82 N.E. 481, 482 (1907) (lawful legitimation creates the 
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formerly required both intermarriage of the parents and acknowledg­
ment by the father to legitimate a child.73 The intermarriage require­
ment was judicially abolished in 1980,74 however, and 
acknowledgment by the father is now sufficient in itself to confer legiti­
macy on a child and establish paternity in the acknowledging father.75 
The statute providing for legitimation does not define acknowl­
legal relation of parent and child). See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of the meaning of "acknowledgment." 
73. The statute as it appeared before 1980 provided in pertinent part: 
An illegitimate person whose parents have intermarried and whose father has 
acknowledged him as his child or has been adjudged his father under chapter two 
hundred and seventy-three shall be deemed legitimate and shall be entitled to take 
the name of his parents to the same extent as if born in lawful wedlock. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West 1958). 
74. Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980). Lowell was a 
landmark decision ruling the intermarriage requirement in chapter 190, section 7 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws unconstitutional. In Lowell, the plaintiff was an illegitimate 
daughter born very shortly after the death of the putative father. Allyson Lowen sought a 
declaratory judgment that she was in fact the child of the decedent unwed father and there­
fore entitled to share in the distribution of his intestate estate. The decedent had never 
married the child's mother nor had he ever been adjudicated the father. The probate court 
held that the child was not entitled to share in the decedent's intestate estate because her 
parents had never married, as required by statute. 
The supreme judicial court found that the statute, as read, would mean that even 
where a putative father had publicly and consistently acknowledged the child as his own, 
the child would not be legitimate nor entitled to an intestate share of the father's estate 
unless the parents had intermarried. Conceding that the state had a compelling interest in 
avoiding fraudulent claims against the estate of a man who died intestate, the Lowell court 
found no justification for denying the right of a child to inherit from his or her natural 
father when paternity has been admitted. Accordingly, a child is legitimated under Massa­
chusetts law either by an adjudication of paternity, chapter 273, section 12 of the Massa­
chusetts General Laws Annotated or by a father's acknowledgment of his illegitimate child. 
75. The Massachusetts legislature amended chapter 190, section 7 of the Massachu­
setts General Laws Annotated after the Lowell decision. The statute now reads: 
An illegitimate person whose parents have intermarried and whose father has 
acknowledged him as his child or has been adjudged his father under chapter two 
hundred and seventy-three shall be deemed legitimate and shall be entitled to take 
the name of his parents to the same extent as if born in lawful wedlock. If a 
decendent has acknowledged paternity of an illegitimate person or if during his 
lifetime or after his death a decedent has been adjudged to be the father of an 
illegitimate person, that person is heir of his father and of any person from whom 
his father might have inherited, if living, and the descendents of an illegitimate 
person shall represent that person and take by descent any estate which such 
person would have taken, if living. A person may establish paternity if, within the 
period provided under section nine of chapter one hundred and ninety-seven of 
the General Laws for bringing actions against executors and administrators, such 
person either [a] delivers to the executor or administrator an authenticated copy 
of a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, an action in which 
the executor or administrator is a named party and in which such paternity is 
ultimately proved. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West Supp. 1986). 
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edgment,76 but Massachusetts courts have construed the term to in­
clude written statements of paternity, oral declarations, and conduct 
that indicates an intent to acknowledge paternity.77 For example, in 
Lowell v. Kowalski, an illegitimate daughter asserted her right to in­
herit from her unwed father's intestate estate.78 The court upheld that 
right and found that the decedent's written acknowledgment of his 
paternity of the child was sufficient to constitute acknowledgment and 
legitimacy for the purpose of intestate succession.79 
In Wrenn v. Harris, the federal district court of Massachusetts 
considered the claim of an illegitimate child for Social Security Act 
survivor's benefits after the death of the child's natural father.80 The 
court held that under Massachusetts law the decedent's statements of 
his paternity to his sisters, co-workers, and members of the child's 
mother's family, as well as statements he made in letters, constituted 
acknowledgment of the child, who was therefore entitled to benefits.81 
Finally, the Massachusetts appeals court has held in Higgins v. Ripley, 
a case involving the rights of an illegitimate child to share in the intes­
tate estate of the deceased unwed father, that the decedent father's 
visits to the child, along with testimony of the child's mother, the 
child's pediatrician, and a friend that the decedent had admitted pater­
nity of the child, were sufficient to show that the decedent had ac­
knowledged the child. 82 
The difficulties presented by acknowledgment as a means by 
which a putative father can establish paternal rights involve, once 
76. In Wrenn v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1980), the district court ex­
plained that "[w]hen it amended the statute, the legislature, presumably aware of the Low­
ell decision, nevertheless passed up the opportunity to specify the permissible forms of 
acknowledgement. Hence, the legislature apparently intended the courts to draw the pre­
cise contours of the statutory requirement." Id. at 225. 
77. In addition to this type of acknowledgement by behavior, Massachusetts pro­
vides for a specialized form of acknowledgement by oath to be used only in the context of 
non-support proceedings. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 273, § 15 provides that "[i]f [a 
putative father] has sworn to and executed an acknowledgement of paternity which was 
accompanied by a written affirmation of paternity sworn to and executed by the mother, 
such acknowledgement shall be admissible as evidence. . . ." Besides being quite limited 
in application, the statute poses great obstacles for the putative father seeking to establish 
paternity. The requirement that a putative father's acknowledgment be accompanied by 
the mother's oath empowers the mother to prevent a putative father from utilizing this 
statutory mechanism as evidence of paternity. The statute is, therefore, of extremely lim­
ited use in situations such as that arising in P.B. C 
78. Lowell, 380 Mass. at 670, 405 N.E.2d at 141; see supra note 74. 
79. Id. 
80. Wrenn, 503 F. Supp. at 226. 
81. Id. 
82. Higgins v. Ripley, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 929, 450 N.E.2d 186, 186 (1983). 
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again, the extent of the mother's control over the process. In the usual 
case, a newborn child is in the custody of the mother, whether she is 
wed or unwed, and no question about her parentage exists. The 
mother, having custody and control over the child, is thus in a posi­
tion to determine whether or not the putative father is able to take 
steps which produce evidence of a parent-child relationship, thereby 
acknowledging his paternity by his conduct. The putative father's 
ability to acquire a relationship with his child that would meet the 
legal requirements of acknowledgment is therefore contingent on the 
mother's cooperation. 
In the situation in P.B. C, the mother prevented the putative fa­
ther from having contact with the child and ensured that he would be 
unable to establish paternity by acknowledgment. The putative father, 
completely subject to the mother's will, was left in the impossible situ­
ation of not being able to establish paternity until he had had substan­
tial contact with the child and not being able to have that contact until 
he had established paternity. Acknowledgment, like marriage to the 
child's mother, is therefore a remedy of limited value to putative fa­
thers in situations like that of the putative father P.B. C 
3. Adjudication of Paternity 
A third possible way for a putative father to establish paternity is 
through a judicial adjudication of paternity. Massachusetts law pro­
vides by statute for "proceedings to determine the father of a child 
born to an unmarried woman."83 The legislature intended the statute 
for use by an unmarried woman who seeks to compel a man to accept 
responsibility for his paternity and provide child support,84 and the 
83. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 12 (West Supp. 1985) provides: 
Proceedings to determine the father of a child born to an unmarried woman shall 
be begun, if in the superior court, in the county in which is situated the place 
where the alleged father or mother of the illegitimate child lives, and if begun in a 
district court, in the court having such place within the jUdicial district. If the 
alleged father pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is found guilty, the court shall 
adjudge him the father of the child; but such adjudication shall not be made after 
a plea of not guilty, against the objection of the alleged father, until the child is 
born or the court finds that the mother is a least six months pregnant. At the 
sitting when such adjudication is made by a district court, if made after a plea of 
not guilty, the alleged father may appeal therefrom to a jury of six session of the 
district court department in the county where the proceedings were held. The 
adjudication, whether any sentence be imposed or not, shall be final and conclu­
sive unless an appeal therefrom be taken as hereinbefore provided. . . . 
84. Commonwealth v. Dias, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 282,423 N.E.2d 803 (1981) (purpose 
of chapter 273, section 12 of the Massachusetts General Laws is to determine paternity and 
provide for support of child), superseded, 385 Mass. 455, 432 N.E.2d 506 (1982). 
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statute apparently does not create a cause of action for fathers. 
Through references to alleged fathers as defendants, the language of 
the statute appears to preclude men from filing suit under it,85 and the 
Massachusetts high court has so interpreted it. 86 The P.B. C. plaintiff, 
therefore, lacked anY'opportunity to establish his paternity by means 
of a paternity suit brought pursuant to this statute. 
4. Equity Jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court 
The second statutory forum for determining paternity in Massa­
chusetts lies within the general equity jurisdiction of the probate and 
family court.87 A putative father who believes that he is the father of 
an illegitimate child may invoke this equity jurisdiction to establish 
85. Chapter 273, section 12 of the Massachusetts General Laws speaks of an alleged 
father who "pleads guilty or nolo contendere" or "is found guilty" and who may "appeal" 
from the adjudication "whether any sentence be imposed or not." Such language clearly 
implies that men are intended to be defendants, not plaintiffs, in paternity adjudications 
pursuant to the statute. 
86. Gardner v. Rothman, 370 Mass. 79, 80, 345 N.E.2d 370, 371 (1976) (paternity 
proceedings under chapter 273, section 12 of the Massachusetts General Laws are not initi· 
ated by the putative father). In Normand v. Barkei, the supreme judicial court faced the 
issue of whether a putative father can institute paternity proceedings pursuant to chapter 
273, § 12. The plaintiff asserted that he was the father of an illegitimate child and sought 
visitation rights. Because the child's mother disputed whether the plaintiff was indeed the 
father, it was necessary, as a first step, that the court determine paternity prior to issuing an 
order for visitation. In reviewing the plaintiff's action, the supreme judicial court empha­
sized that a putative father's resort to chapter 273, § 12 could "hardly be expected." Nor­
mand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 852,434 N.E.2d 631, 632 (1982). 
Likewise, in Gardner, where the father of an illegitimate child sought to obtain rights 
to visit the child, the court stated that "[p]roceedings under chapter 273, §§ 11-19 are ... 
not initiated by the putative father." Gardner at 80, 345 N.E.2d at 371. 
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 6 (West Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent 
part: 
The probate and family court department shall have original and concurrent ju­
risdiction with the supreme judicial court and the superior court department of 
all cases and matters of equity cognizable under the general principles of equity 
jurisprudence and, with reference thereto, shall be courts of general equity juris­
diction, except that the superior court department shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction of all actions in which injunctive relief is sought in any matter grow­
ing out of a labor dispute as defined in section twenty C of chapter one hundred 
and forty-nine. 
Probate courts shall also have jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme judi­
cial and superior courts, of all cases and matters in which equitable relief is 
sought relative ... [and to] grant equitable relief to enforce foreign judgments 
for support of a wife or a wife and minor children against a husband who is a 
resident or inhabitant of this commonwealth, upon an action by the wife com­
menced in the county of which the husband is a resident or inhabitant. They 
shall, after the divorce judgment has become absolute, also have concurrent juris­
diction to grant equitable relief in controversies over property between persons 
who have been divorced. . . . 
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paternity and be afforded visitation rights.88 
In Normand v. Barkei, a man who claimed to be the father of two 
illegitimate children sought an order from the probate and family 
court granting him visitation rights. 89 The defendant mother denied 
that the plaintiff was the father of one of the 'children and doubted 
whether he was the father of the other child.90 In reviewing the trial 
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate paternity, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the notion that "the 
Probate and Family Court could not act where the plaintiff's paternity 
has not been conceded by the defendant mother or otherwise estab­
lished"91 because to so limit the lower court's jurisdiction would have 
the result of endorsing the defendant mother's "[absolute] control [of] 
the plaintiff's access to the courtS."92 
Relying on Normand,93 the P.B. C. plaintiff brought his claim for 
an adjudication of paternity under the probate and family court's eq­
uity jurisdiction.94 The supreme judicial court, however, declared this 
reliance to be misplaced. The court distinguished Normand, explain­
ing that jurisdiction is conferred on the lower court to adjudicate pa­
ternity claims brought solely by fathers of illegitimate children.95 
Where a presumption of paternity in a married woman's husband af­
fords legitimacy to a child, however, no illegitimate child exists to con­
fer the appropriate jurisdiction on the probate and family court. The 
88. Normand, 385 Mass. at 853, 434 N.E.2d at 623. When paternity is acknowl­
edged by both parents and custody or visitation is in dispute, the probate and family court 
makes findings and orders appropriate to resolving the conflict. Gardner, 370 Mass. at 80, 
345 N.E.2d at 371. When paternity is not conceded by the mother, the court simply deter­
mines paternity as a first step and then, if the plaintiff is determined to be the father, makes 
a decision as to what, if any, visitation rights he should have. Normand, 385 Mass. at 853, 
434 N.E.2d at 632-33. 
89. Normand, 385 Mass. at 851, 434 N.E.2d at 632. 
90. Id. 
91. /d. at 852, 434 N.E.2d at 632. 
92. Id. at 853, 434 N.E.2d at 633. 
93. In fact, the attorney for the plaintiff in P.B.C believed that Normand was di­
rectly controlling, explaining that H[w]e always thought we were dealing with an illegiti­
mate child." Telephone interview with Marian Carpenter, attorney for the plaintiff in 
P.B.C (December 6, 1985). 
94. P.D.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
95. The court stated: 
The question [of whether plaintiff can rebut the presumption of legitimacy] was 
not before us in Normand v. Barkei,. . . on which the plaintiff relies as support 
for his contention that he has a right to prove that he is the child's father. Nor­
mand v. Barkei . . . sheds little light on the issue before us because in that case 
the children's mother was unmarried when the children were conceived and were 
born. There was no question of legitimacy. 
Id. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096 (emphasis added). 
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court's ability to hear a putative father's claim, and his corresponding 
ability to seek redress are thus restricted by the presumption of 
legitimacy.96 
This part of the note has demonstrated how the supreme judicial 
court's decision in P.D. C. in the context of Massachusetts paternity 
law, classifies parents by giving putative fathers fewer rights than pre­
sumed fathers and, indeed, often precluding putative fathers from be­
ing able to establish paternity. Because presumed fathers do not have 
to establish paternity and are provided with ample methods of pro­
tecting their parent-child relationship, the classification scheme impli­
cates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
When the equal protection clause is so implicated, a court must 
consider whether the classification affects either a suspect class or a 
fundamental right.97 If it does, the court must strictly scrutinize the 
classification, and it will survive constitutional attack only if the state's 
ends are found to be compelling, and the means to that end are nar­
rowly drawn.98 The next part of the note will argue that the right 
affected by the classification of parents-the right to establish pater­
nity-is a fundamental right.99 
96. The putative father in P.B. C essentially asserted that his child was born out of 
wedlock, in that the child was the product of a union between himself and a woman not his 
wife. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. 68, 483 N.E.2d 1095. This paralleled the claim of the 
putative father in Normand. Normand, 385 Mass. at 851, 434 N.E.2d at 632. In P.B.C, 
the court did not order an adjudication of paternity because of its adherence to the pre­
sumption of paternity in the mother's husband. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 75, 483 
N.E.2d at 1099. In the absence of any presumption of legitimacy, the Normand court did 
remand the case to probate court for a determination of paternity. Normand, 385 Mass. at 
853, 434 N.E.2d at 633. Reading the two cases together reveals, therefore, that, pursuant to 
chapter 213, section 6 of the Massachusetts General Laws, the probate court, while em­
powered to adjudicate the paternity of an illegitimate child, is precluded from doing so in 
the face of a presumption of legitimacy. 
97. See infra notes 101-166 and accompanying text. 
98. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
99. This note does not assert that putative fathers constitute a suspect class. The 
Supreme Court has found that suspect classifications under the equal protection clause are 
those which classify by alienage or national origin or by race. See, e.g., Graham v. Rich­
ardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race). Such 
classifications will be subjected to strict scrutiny because "[t]hese factors are so seldom 
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such 
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy ...." City of Cleburne, Tex. 
v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985). 
Gender based classifications, because they so often rest on stereotypes rather than 
valid distinctions between the sexes, are subjected to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
Thus the Court has looked at the nature ofthe group affected by a classification; where 
a classification is broadly drawn, and the affected group can resort to the democratic polit­
ical process to correct unwise or unfair classifications the Court has been willing to uphold 
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IV. ESTABLISHING PATERNITY: A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
The Supreme Court has protected familial interests and concerns 
in a long line of cases and in a variety of contexts. 100 While emphasiz­
ing that the freedom to enter into and maintain family relationships is 
a "fundamental element of personal liberty,"101 the Court has none­
theless varied the nature and extent of the constitutional protection 
given to the formation and maintenance of familial associations de­
pending on the particular factual setting involved. 102 Some aspects of 
familial relationships, then, are considered fundamental and thus wor­
thy of the highest degree of constitutional protection, while others are 
given less protection or none at all. 
In assessing the amount of protection to be afforded to particular 
familial choices, the Court strives to find a "balance ... [between] 
respect for the liberty of the individual. . . and the demands of organ­
ized society."103 In striking that balance, although mindful of tradi­
tions which have been discarded as well as those which have 
endured,I04 the Court has historically afforded the most protection to 
familial interests associated with such traditional institutions as mar-
the state scheme. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 
(1976) (retirement guidelines affecting older workers is not a suspect classification). Where 
a classification affects "discrete and insular minorities" for whom the operation of the polit­
ical process is seriously curtailed, the Court has found "a more searching judicial inquiry" 
to be appropriate. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
Putative fathers, as a class, do not possess such immutable characteristics as sex or 
race which distinguish them from other fathers. Nor is there any indication that their 
access to and voice in the political process is hampered. In sum, putative fathers do not 
share those qualities which the Court has traditionally pointed to in delineating suspect 
classifications. 
100. In Moore v. City ofEast Cleve/and, 431 U.S. 494, 500-01 (1977) (citations omit­
ted), the Court reviewed the parameters of this protection, noting that it had protected 
family interests "concerned with freedom of choice with respect to childbearing, or with 
the rights of parents to the custody and companionship of their own children, or with 
traditional parental authority in matters of child rearing and education." 
101. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3249 (1984). 
102. In Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3249, the Court articulated the barometer of constitu­
tional protection as the degree of intimacy involved in the particular relationship, stating 
that "certain kinds of highly personal relationships [ will receive] a substantial measure of 
sanctuary from unjustified intrusion by the state." For the Court in Roberts, those relation­
ships included: "the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage . . . childbirth . . . 
and cohabitation with one's relatives." Id. at 3250. 
103. Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
104. The Court articulated an awareness of "the traditions from which [this balance 
of societal versus private interests] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. 
That tradition is a living thing .... [A] decision which builds on what has survived is 
likely to be sound." Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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riage and the nuclear family.105 For example, the Court has held that 
rights associated with marital privacy lO6 and parental authority lO7 are 
fundamental rights. 
Recently, however, the Court has delved beneath the surface of 
superficial factual settings to protect familial rights and relationships 
in nontraditional settings lO8 by invoking the basic principles underly­
ing its decisions in traditional areas of family life. In articulating those 
basic principles, the Court has focused on the "constitutionally recog­
nized liberty interest that derives from blood relationship ... and 
basic human right." 109 Indeed, the Court has concluded that the legal 
status of families is not the determinant factor in regards to whether a 
particular interest or relationship should be protected as fundamen­
tal. 110 Rather, the underlying blood tie and the relationship that may 
arise therefrom are of paramount import. I II The Court has thus im­
plicitly acknowledged that "[b]iological [rather than legal] relation­
ship is the test that has been used-since time immemorial-. . . for 
the fixing of. . . familial obligations, and it is biological relationship 
that underlies and is traced by legal relationship."112 
This section of the note will argue that a putative father's right to 
establish paternity, although arising in a nontraditional setting, is a 
fundamental right because it implicates the core biological relationship 
between parent and child. By examining the Court's treatment of a 
father's rights arising from his biological relationship to his illegiti­
mate child, as well as the values underlying the Court's decisions in 
more traditional family contexts, this section of the note will show 
how granting fundamental status to a father's ability to prove pater­
nity is both a logical extension of and consistent with the Court's deci­
105. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-05. 
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law forbidding the use of 
contraceptives is an unconstitutional interference with the right of marital privacy). 
107. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents have the freedom to choose to 
enroll their children in private schools); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
(state may not interfere with parental freedom to decide to have children instructed in 
foreign languages). 
108. See infra notes 114-120 and accompanying text. See also Caban v. Moham­
med, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
109. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977) (N.Y. pro­
cedures for removing children from custody of foster families are constitutionally 
adequate). 
110. Smith, 431 U.S. at 845 n.53. 
111. H. KRAUSE, supra note 3 at 69. 
112. Id. 
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sions in this area. 113 
A. The Supreme Court's Approach to Biological Fathers 
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has decided four cases regarding 
the rights of biological fathers in regard to their illegitimate children. 
In the landmark case of Stanley v. Illinois,114 the Court explicitly rec­
ognized the "significant interest" of an unwed father in securing and 
protecting his relationship with his child. I IS The plaintiff in Stanley, 
an unwed father, challenged an Illinois statute that attached a pre­
sumption of parental unfitness to an unwed father and provided, there­
fore, that upon the death of the child's mother, the illegitimate child 
would become a ward of the state. 116 The plaintiff argued that due 
process entitled him to a fitness hearing before his child could be taken 
away from him, and the Court agreed. 1l7 
Noting that the unwed father in Stanley had taken parental re­
sponsibility for his children by living with them since birth, the Court 
found that his interest in the "companionship, care, [and] custody 
. . ." of his children was fundamental. 118 The Court further found 
that, although procedure by presumption was speedy and inexpensive, 
the important nature of a father's interest in his child required the 
protection of a fitness hearing}19 Although arising in the context of 
procedural due process, 120 Stanley represents a strong indication of the 
113. An ongoing debate among scholars of constitutional law concerns whether the 
Court ought to be deriving "new" fundamental values in the course of constitutional adju­
dication. While the Constitution guarantees certain specific, named rights, it also contains 
open-ended provisions which call for judicial interpretation to determine their precise con­
tent as applied to a given case. For the view that the Court's analysis should center on 
written constitutional text except where the right at issue is one not fully protected by the 
political process, see, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-72 (1980). For the view 
that tradition, history, and basic national values are legitimate sources of constitutional 
interpretation, see, e.g., Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
703 (1975). 
114. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
115. The Court stated that "[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children 
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful counter­
vailing interest, protection." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
116. Id. at 646. 
117. Id. at 657-58. 
118. Id. at 651-52. 
119. Id. at 658. 
120. Stanley involved a procedural due process claim while this note presents a fun­
damental right analysis under equal protection. In both cases, however, a state foreclosed a 
father's interest in his child by the operation of a presumption. The plaintiff in Stanley was 
afforded no opportunity to rebut the presumption of unfitness of an unwed father; the 
P.B.C plaintiff was prevented from attempting to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. 
Illinois and Massachusetts thus used similar "procedure by presumption" devices to deny a 
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Court's desire to afford maximum protection to parent-child 
relationships. 
Six years later, in Quilloin v. Walcott,121 the Court encountered 
another situation involving the rights of an unwed father. In Quilloin, 
the plaintiff attempted to veto the adoption of his child by the child's 
mother and her husband. 122 Finding that the plaintiff had never exer­
cised any significant responsibility for the child during its eleven years, 
the Court was able to distinguish Stanley and hold that the plaintiff in 
Quilloin had no right to veto the adoption. 123 
One year after Quilloin, an unwed father who had significantly 
participated in his child's upbringing, even though he was not then 
living with the child, appealed to the Supreme Court the denial of his 
attempt to veto the child's adoption. In Caban v. Mohammed,124 the 
Court held that when a biological father takes paternal responsibility 
for his child, the Constitution will protect his rights to that child 
whether or not he lives with the child. 125 Caban was thus entitled to 
participate in the decision concerning his child's adoption. 126 
The most recent biological father case to come before the Court 
was Lehr v. Robertson. 127 In Lehr the Supreme Court rejected a claim 
from a putative father challenging a New York statute which denied 
him notice and a hearing before the adoption of his illegitimate 
child. 128 The Court noted that the putative father had not used the 
state procedure for asserting parental rights-signing New York's pu­
tative father registry, which would have assured him of notice of adop­
man's parental interest in his child. The Court's deference to the "substantial and cogniza­
ble" interest of a father in his children in Stanley and its refusal to validate Illinois' reliance 
on mere presumption as a basis for state action these circumstances signals that, at least, a 
state must provide an opportunity for rebuttal of the underlying presumption when it acts 
to impinge upon a significant parental interest. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650-5\. This note 
argues that establishing paternity is a similarly vital parental interest for the plaintiff in 
P.B.C. See infra notes 138-143 and accompanying text. The Stanley Court placed a high 
value on protecting the parent-child relationship; so high, indeed, that had Illinois bur­
dened that relationship by means of a substantive rather than procedural law, the Court's 
solicitude for the parent-child tie would have led to judicial invalidation of the law even 
under substantive due process. Fundamental values, although derived under substantive 
due process, are also a touchstone for analysis under equal protection. See, e.g., Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (the right to marry, determined to be fundamental in a sub­
stantive due process analysis, examined under equal protection strict scrutiny analysis). 
12\' Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
122. [d. at 247. 
123. [d. at 255-56. 
124. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
125. [d. at 393-94. 
126. [d. at 394. 
127. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
128. [d. at 250. 
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tion proceedings-and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. 129 
In Lehr the Court drew on the principles underlying its decisions 
in Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban to announce the principle that the 
Constitution protects an established relationship between parents and 
their children, but not "the mere existence of biological links ...."130 
The Court described "[t]he significance of the biological connection 
..." in Lehr as "offer[ing] ... an opportunity ... to develop a rela­
tionship" with the child. \31 The Court explained that 
If [the biological father] grasps that opportunity and accepts 
some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy 
the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely val­
uable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, 
the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to 
listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.132 
Both Stanley and Caban had "grasp[ed] [the] opportunity," and 
the Court held the resulting relationship to be worthy of the highest 
degree of constitutional protection. \33 Quilloin, on the other hand, 
who had not acted on the opportunity to develop a relationship with 
his child, did not have a fundamental interest worthy of constitutional 
protection. 134 
Lehr was significantly different from Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban 
because it was the only case in which the putative father alleged that 
the child's mother had thwarted his efforts to "grasp [the] opportu­
nity" to develop a relationship with his child. 135 Nevertheless, the 
Court stressed that, via the putative father registry, the state had pro­
vided Lehr with an alternative method for asserting parental rights. 
Thus the Court found no constitutional infirmity where the claiming 
129. Id. at 250-51. 
130. Id. at 261. 
131. Id. at 262. 
132. Id. 
133. In Stanley, the mother and putative father had lived together "intermittently" 
for 18 years. During that time they had three children. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. In 
Caban, the couple lived together from September, 1968 until the latter part of 1973. The 
mother, Maria, gave birth to two children, David in 1969, and Denise in 1971. Caban, 441 
U.S. at 382. 
134. In Quilloin, the mother and natural father never married nor lived together. 
The child was born in 1964, however, adoption proceedings were not begun until 1976 and 
it was at this time that the natural father first expressed an interest in him. Quilloin, 434 
U.S. at 247. The Court noted that the father had "never exercised actual or legal custody 
over his child, and thus hal d) never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to 
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child." Id. at 256. 
135. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting). 
253 1986] PUTATIVE FATHERS 
father had not availed himself of this state-provided alternative. 136 
The Court expressed doubt, however, about the constitutionality of a 
scheme which would place the putative father's ability to establish a 
parent-child relationship--protectable as a fundamental right-wholly 
beyond his control. 137 
The Court has never addressed the issue presented by P.B. c., that 
of protecting a putative father's right to develop a relationship with his 
child when he is given no opportunity to do SO.138 In the situation 
faced by the putative father in P.B. c., the child's mother resisted his 
efforts to participate in the child's upbringing, and the state, offering 
no effective alternative method for securing parental rights, ultimately 
blocked his last attempt to gain an interest in the child that might be 
his.139 Despite his alleged biological connection to the child, neither 
the state nor the mother gave the putative father an opportunity to 
take the steps which would establish a parent-child relationship "of 
the highest constitutional significance."I40 Clearly, without such an 
136. Id. at 265. 
137. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, recognized that, "if qualification for 
notice were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be thought proce­
durally inadequate." Id. at 264. 
138. While Massachusetts, like New York, does provide a statutory method by 
which a putative father may receive notice of adoption proceedings, that method would not 
have helped the putative father in P.B.C. to prove paternity. 
Chapter 210, section 4A of the Massachusettts General Laws provides that when an 
unmarried woman gives birth to a child, a man claiming to be the father may file a paternal 
responsibility claim with the Massachusetts Department of Social Services. Such a filing 
entitles a putative father to receive notice of any adoption preceedings involving the child. 
Two problems arise under this statute for a putative father who, like the plaintiff in 
P.B. c., seeks not only notice of adoption, but also the right to establish a parent-child 
relationship with a child who was conceived by a married woman. 
First, the statute provides merely for notice of adoption proceedings. This was not the 
remedy sought by P.B.C. Mere notice of adoption is a hollow remedy for a man who seeks 
to prove his paternity, and upon that biological link, develop an intimate familial relation­
ship with his child. This statute thus provides an inadequate remedy to a putative father 
who desires to make a "full committment to the responsibilities of parenthood." 
Secondly, the statute allows paternal responsibility claims regarding children "born 
out of wedlock." The supreme judicial court has explicitly stated that a child conceived by 
a married woman is not illegitimate even though she is no longer married at the time of the 
child's birth. This administrative procedure would therefore have been unavailable to a 
putative father whose child was conceived by a married woman, as was the circumstance 
for the plaintiff in P.B. C. P.B. c., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. 
The paternal responsibility claim is therefore an ineffective remedy for a putative fa­
ther who seeks rights more extensive than simple notice of adoption and whose child was 
presumed to be the legitimate issue of a married woman and her former husband. 
139. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99. See supra notes 66­
96. 
140. E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights ofUnwed Fathers Before and After Lehr 
v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 351 (1984). 
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opportunity, "the protected [relationship] ... will never arise."141 
If an established parent-child relationship is protected by the 
Constitution as a fundamental right, the critical question raised by 
P.B. C. is whether the opportunity to develop that relationship should 
also be protected as a fundamental right. This note argues that it must 
be, for not protecting the opportunity has the effect of completely evis­
cerating the right. 
Treating an unwed father's right to prove paternity as a funda­
mental right is a logical extension of the doctrine developed in Stanley, 
Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr. If the Court is to protect as fundamental 
established relationships between fathers and their children,142 then it 
must also give utmost protection to the means by which a putative 
father may achieve that established relationship. When a mother 
blocks a putative father's attempts to establish a relationship with his 
alleged child, and the state provides no alternative means for him to 
do so, then the putative father's only recourse is a judicial determina­
tion that he is, indeed, the father of the child. Only that determination 
will enable the putative father to gain visitation, custody, or other ac­
cess to the child,143 which will, in tum, allow him to establish a re1a­
141. Id. 
142. See supra notes 114-134 and accompanying text. 
143. Once a putative father is adjudicated the biological father of a child, he will 
have the opportunity to develop a relationship with the child, if that is in the child's best 
interest. Massachusetts courts are required to make decisions affecting children with the 
goal of determining and effectuating the best interest of the child. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1985): 
In making an order or judgment relative to the custody of children pending a 
controversy between their parents, or relative to their final possession, the rights 
of the parents shall, in the absence of misconduct, be held to be equal, and the 
happiness and welfare of the children shall determine their custody or possession. 
Upon the filing of an action in accordance with the provisions of this section, 
section twenty-eight of this chapter or section thirty-two of chapter two hundred 
and nine and until a judgment on the merits is rendered, absent emergency condi­
tions, abuse or neglect, the parents shall have shared legal custody of any minor 
child of the marriage; provided, however, that the judge may enter an order for 
temporary legal custody for one parent if written findings are made that such 
shared custody would not be in the best interest ofthe child and that the parties do 
not have a history of being able and willing to cooperate in matters concerning 
the child. The court shall require the parents to submit a plan in writing to the 
court within thirty days of the entry of the temporary custody order setting forth 
the details of shared legal custody including but not limited to procedures for 
resolving disputes between the parties with respect to child raising decisions and 
duties. If at the time of the hearing on the merits the parties have filed such a 
plan with repspect to shared legal custody, and the court determines that the plan 
has made proper provisions in the best interest of the child, and that the parties 
have carried out the provisions of the plan in the best interest of the child, both 
parties shall continue to have shared legal custody of the child. The court may 
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tionship worthy of protection as a fundamental right. Protecting as 
fundamental a man's right to prove that he is the biological father of 
his child is thus a logical and necessary extension of constitutional 
doctrine in the area of familial relationships. 
If the right to establish paternity is not a fundamental right, then 
a court would be able to rebuff a putative father's effort to adjudicate 
paternity. Not recognized legally as the father and turned away by 
the mother, the putative father would be left empty handed and would 
have no hope of ever establishing a paternal relationship significant 
enough to be protected as fundamental. If a putative father's right to 
prove paternity is not treated as a fundamental right, then the putative 
father's fundamental right that arises from an established relationship 
stems from the purely fortuitous circumstance that the child's mother 
permitted it. To anchor the father's right to his child to the good will 
of the mother is wholly inconsistent with the Court's demonstrated 
concern for the rights of fathers. 
B. 	 Fundamental Rights in the Areas of Procreation, Privacy, and 
Child-Rearing 
In addition to being a logical and necessary extension of existing 
law in the area of biological fathers' relationships with their children, 
finding fundamental a putative father's right to prove paternity is con-
modify the plan with the agreement of both parties and shall review this operation 
of the plan within one year of the date of its adoption, if a hearing on the merits 
has not been held within such time. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit 
the power of the court at such time or any any (sic) time thereafter to make any 
order relative to the custody of the child, including an order for shared legal 
custody, if it determines it to be in the child's best interest. When considering the 
happiness and welfare of the child the court may consider whether or not the 
child's present or past living conditions adversely affects his physical, mental, 
moral or emotional health when making an order or judgment relative to the 
custody of said child. For purposes of this section, shared legal custody shall be 
defined as a continued mutual responsibility and involvement by both parents in 
decisions regarding the child's welfare in matters of education, medical care, emo­
tional, moral and religious development. 
The entry of an order or judgement relative to the custody of minor children 
shall not negate or impede the ability of the parent not granted custody to have 
such access to the academic, medical, hospital, or other health records of the 
child, as he would have had if the custody order or judgement had not been en­
tered. 
Where the parents have reached an agreement providing for the custody of 
the children, the court may enter an order in accordance with such agreement, 
unless specific findings are made by the justice indicating that such an order 
would not be in the best interests of the children. 
(emphasis added). 
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sistent with the values the Supreme Court has sought to protect in the 
areas of procreation, privacy, and child-rearing. 
1. Procreation 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the right of procreation is 
a fundamental right in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rei Williamson. l44 In 
Skinner, an Oklahoma statute required compulsory sterilization upon 
a third conviction for certain felonies, while exempting other enumer­
ated felonies from the sterilization requirement. 145 The Court struck 
down the statute, holding that it violated the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution by singling out some 
felonies, such as larceny, for punishment by sterilization, while ex­
empting similar crimes, such as embezzlement. 146 
In Skinner the Court found procreation to be "one of the basic 
civil rights of man,"147 explaining that the right to have children is 
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,"148 and 
that one who loses that right is "forever deprived of a basic human 
liberty."149 In Skinner, the Supreme Court thus exhibited its deep 
concern for a person's freedom to choose to be a parent. 
A putative father's right to prove paternity embodies values simi­
lar to Skinner's right to procreate. In both instances, the right in­
volves fatherhood, blood ties, and progeny. A man who is precluded 
from asserting his paternity of a child is denied any sense of father­
hood as surely as a man who is rendered sexually sterile. The vasec­
tomy imposed on Skinner by Oklahoma law would have left his sexual 
functioning intact but without any possibility of resulting fatherhood; 
similarly, refusing to permit a putative father to prove paternity would 
have no effect on his sexual freedom or ability, but it would prevent 
him from being a father to his child. Because the right of a man to 
prove paternity implicates the same values the Court protected as fun­
144. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Since Skinner, 
procreation has been protected as a fundamental right in a number of cases. See. e.g., In re 
Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982). in which the court emphasized that the 
personal rights at issue in a request by a parent or guardian for the sterilization of an adult 
mentally retarded female require the judge to use utmost care in effectuating the substituted 
judgment of the ward. Id. at 572, 432 N.E.2d at 724. The court reasoned that the right to 
reproduce and the decision whether or not to have a child are central to the fundamental 
right of privacy. Id. at 563-64, 432 N.E.2d at 719. 
145. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
146. Id. at 541. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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damental in Skinner, it should also be protected as a fundamental 
right. 
2. Privacy 
The Supreme Court has also held that the right of privacy is a 
fundamental right. 150 The Court first identified the right of privacy in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.15I In Griswold, the state of Connecticut pro­
hibited the use of contraceptives by any person, whether married or 
unmarried. 152 The Court found that marital privacy was a fundamen­
tal right, explaining that specific constitutional guarantees have 
"penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance."153 In Griswold the Court conceded that 
the right of marital privacy per se was not an express provision of the 
Constitution, but went on to state that an analysis of the values pro­
tected in the Bill of Rights revealed that certain relationships lie 
"within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu­
tional guarantees."154 The Court held that the right of marital pri­
vacy, while not expressed in the Constitution, was "necessary in 
making the express guarantees fully meaningful."155 Because the Con­
necticut statute so deeply intruded upon the right of marital privacy, 
the Court held that it was unconstitutional. I56 
Aware of the Griswold ruling, Massachusetts tailored its anticon­
traception statute to forbid the distribution of contraceptive articles to 
unmarried persons. 157 The Supreme Court struck down that statute in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird and held that the distinction between married and 
unmarried persons was impermissible. 158 Explaining that the right of 
privacy is not limited to married persons, the Court declared that "[i]f 
150. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,499 (1965) ("[T]he right of privacy in 
the marital relation is fundamental and basic.") (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
151. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. 
152. Id. at 480, quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (West 1958): "Any person 
who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing concep­
tion shaB be fined not less than fifty doBars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more 
than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." (Section 53-32 was repealed in 1969.) 
153. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
154. Id. at 485. 
155. Id. at 483. 
156. Id. at 485-86. 
157. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 450 (1972). The Court noted that "[t]he Mas­
sachusetts Legislature merely made what it thought to be the precise accommodation nec­
essary to escape the Griswold ruling." 
158. Id. at 453. The Court explained that "[W]hatever the rights of the individual to 
access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the 
married alike." 
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the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child."159 In Griswold and Baird, therefore, 
the Court further evidenced its commitment to protecting the privacy 
of a person's decision in regards to parenthood and extended that 
commitment to unmarried persons. l60 
The Court had another opportunity to consider the parameters of 
the right of privacy in Roe v. Wade. 161 In Roe, the Court found that 
the right of privacy includes a woman's decision to have an abor­
tion. 162 The Court drew on previous decisions in which it had found 
fundamental rights in activities relating to parenting, such as Skinner, 
Baird, Pierce v. Society ofSisters, and Meyers v. Nebraska to conclude 
that a woman's choice to abort is a fundamental right. 163 In Roe, 
therefore, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to protect as funda­
mental those choices and responsibilities that involve a person's oppor­
tunity to become a parent. 
The right of a putative father to establish paternity involves val­
ues similar to those involved in a person's right to choose whether or 
not to bring a child into the world. Each situation strikes at the heart 
of one's opportunity to choose whether or not to become a parent, and 
it is the protection of that interest that appears to be of particular im­
portance to the Court. A putative father's inability to prove that he is 
the biological father of a child destroys his potential relationship with 
159. Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 
160. Justice Brennan, the author of the Baird opinion, later reflected on the Gris­
wold-Baird line of cases and offered that, "[r]ead in light of its progeny, the teaching of 
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing 
from unjustified intrusion by the State." Carey v. Population Services International, 431 
U.S. 678, 687 (1977). Although Griswold dealt with couples in a marital relationship, Baird 
"made clear that the constitutional protection of individual autonomy in matters of 
childbearing is not dependent on that element." Id. 
161. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
162. /d. at 154. After determining that the fundamental right to privacy encom­
passes abortion, the Court considered the nature and weight of the state's interest in regu­
lating or even proscribing abortion. After such consideration the Court held that the 
state's interest in regulating abortion in the first trimester of the pregnancy is not compel­
ling enough to overcome the woman's fundamental right to terminate the pregnancy. Id. at 
163. In the second trimester, however, the state's interest in protecting the mother's health 
becomes sufficiently compelling to permit regulation of the abortion procedure in such 
ways as to effectuate that interest, such as licensing the physician who performs the abor­
tion or the facility in which it is performed. Id. Finally, in the last trimester of the preg­
nancy, when the fetus has reached "viability," the state's interest in protecting fetal life 
reaches a level of significance to justify an absolute proscription on abortion. Id. at 163-64. 
163. Id. at 152-53. 
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that child as surely as if the child were never born. That the potential 
relationship arises in a non marital setting has no impact on the degree 
of intimacy and privacy involved, just as the marital status of a person 
seeking to use contraceptives is irrelevant to the importance of the un­
derlying interest. If the Constitution protects a person's childbearing 
decision as fundamental, so it must protect a man's opportunity to 
establish paternity. 
3. Child-Rearing 
In addition to procreation and privacy, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the authority of parents to make decisions regarding 
their children's upbringing is a fundamental right. In Meyers, the 
Court invalidated a state law forbidding the teaching of certain foreign 
languages to children, holding that the law unreasonably infringed 
upon a basic liberty, guaranteed by the Constitution, "to establish a 
home and bring up children."l64 Similarly, the Court applied the 
highest degree of constitutional protection for parental authority in 
Pierce. 165 Reasoning that a parent's traditional authority in decisions 
affecting his child is a fundamental right, the Court held that a state 
must allow parents the freedom to choose to send their children to 
private rather than public schools. 166 These cases reveal the Court's 
strong concern that traditional parental decisionmaking be free from 
unwarranted intrusion by the government. 
A putative father who is not permitted to establish his paternity 
of a child is perforce precluded from playing any role in the rearing of 
his child. A parental relationship with the child is an obvious prereq­
uisite to the exercise of any parental authority over that child. Meyers 
and Pierce concededly involved governmental respect for the authority 
of those who were undisputedly the parents of the children affected by 
the decisions, while P.B. C. involves a putative father whose paternity 
is controverted. Nevertheless, the fundamental liberty of a parent to 
raise his or her child is meaningless where a parent is unable, as a first 
step, to show even the existence 'of a parent-child link. By refusing to 
allow this putative father to attempt to prove his paternity, Massachu­
setts has effectively eliminated any possibility of P.B.C.'s enjoying a 
fundamental right that belongs to all parents. 
This section of the note has demonstrated that a putative father's 
right to prove paternity must be protected as a fundamental right for 
164. Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
165. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
166. Id. at 535. 
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two reasons. The first reason is because treating it as a fundamental 
right is a logical and necessary extension of the Supreme Court's deci­
sions in the area of unwed fathers and their illegitimate children. 
Granting a putative father the opportunity to prove his biological rela­
tionship to a child enables him to obtain visitation and other access to 
that child. With such access, he will be able to establish a relationship 
with the child. With that established relationship, he will be afforded 
the utmost constitutional protection of his biological relationship to 
the child. The removal of the first link, the opportunity to prove pa­
ternity, results in the collapse of the entire structure: the putative fa­
ther's biological relationship with his child is not protected because it 
is not "established," and it is not "established" because he is not able 
to prove the fact of the biological link. Such a result would severely 
undercut the Court's decisions from Stanley to Lehr. 
The second reason why a putative father's right to prove pater­
nity should be protected as a fundamental right is because doing so 
would be consistent with the values that the Supreme Court has pro­
tected in the areas of procreation, privacy, and child-rearing. From 
Skinner to Griswold to Baird and Roe, from Meyers to Pierce, the 
Court has sought to protect as fundamental both a person's choice to 
become a parent and the resulting decisions that arise from such a 
choice. Depriving a man of the right to prove that he is the father of a 
child has the effect of depriving him not only of the right to choose to 
become a parent, but also of the right to make any decisions in regards 
to that child. Granting a putative father the right to establish pater­
nity would, on the other hand, give effect to his choice to become a 
parent and thus be consistent with the Court's decisions in these areas. 
V. 	 STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 
CLASSIFICATION 
Where a state action burdens a fundamental right, the Supreme 
Court has applied strict judicial scrutiny to assess the constitutionality 
of the action. 167 When strict scrutiny is applied, the state action will 
167. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Texas system 
of school financing, based on local property taxes, upheld despite resulting disparities in 
funds available to local school districts) "We must decide first, whether the Texas system of 
financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges 
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby 
requiring strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 17. 
If the state action does not impact upon a fundamental right, then a less rigorous 
"rational basis" te~t is used to assess the validity of the action. If no fundamental right is 
involved, "the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an 
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survive constitutional attack only if it serves a compelling state inter­
est, and the means are narrowly tailored to effect that interest. 168 This 
part of the note will analyze the Massachusetts parental classification 
system described in Part III in the context of strict scrutiny and will 
argue that that classification system which burdens a putative father's 
fundamental right to establish his paternity, does not survive such a 
strict scrutiny analysis. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court identified three state 
interests to support its holding in P.B. C. . These are promoting the 
legitimacy of children,169 protecting family harmony,170 and ensuring 
the care and support of children. 171 Each interest will be discussed in 
tum. 172 
A. Promoting the Legitimacy of Children 
In P.B. C. the supreme judicial court relied upon "the important 
social policy of affording legitimacy to children whenever possible"173 
to justify its refusal to allow the putative father to rebut the presump­
tion of legitimacy in the mother's husband. This part of the note will 
invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587-88 (11th ed. 
1985). 
168. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 725 (1973) (resident alien's right to prac­
tice law not overcome even in the face of the state's interest in assuring the qualifications of 
persons permitted to practice law, because state failed to show that the classification was 
"necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest."); Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state laws excluding aliens from state public assistance benefits or 
imposing a long residency requirement struck down because such laws were not adequately 
justified by interest in preserving public resources); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969) (state interest in conserving revenue by imposing a waiting period as a prerequisite 
to receiving welfare benefits struck down as an impermissible burden on the fundamental 
right to interstate travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 11 (1967) (state law prohibiting 
interracial marriages struck down because state failed to show that the law was "necessary 
to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective"). 
169. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
170. Id. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
171. Id. 
172. In Wrenn v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 233 (1980), the Massachusetts federal district 
court commented on another state interest of relevance here, the interest in avoiding fraud­
ulent paternity claims, and alluded to "the danger that the wrong person may be charged 
with fatherhood." Id. at 226. The Supreme Court has found that medical progress has 
rendered this state interest less compelling as paternity testing has become more accurate. 
In Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983), a case striking down a two-year statute of limita­
tions on the bringing of paternity actions, the Court stated that "the State's interest in 
preventing the litigation of state or fraudulent paternity claims has become more attenuated 
as scientific advances in blood testing have alleviated the problems of proof surrounding 
paternity actions." Id. at 17. 
173. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
262 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:229 
argue that a policy favoring legitimacy over illegitimacy is impermissi­
ble under the Constitution. 
Prejudice against illegitimacy undeniably exists in our society. 174 
Although the stigma attached to illegitimacy may well be diminishing, 
it nonetheless remains an important social force. 175 The issue is less 
whether social stigma is cast on illegitimacy than "whether the reality 
of private biases. . . [is a] permissible consideration"176 upon which 
the state may base its action. 
In Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision of 
a Florida state court divesting a mother of custody of her child.177 
Pursuant to a divorce decree, Linda Sidoti had been awarded custody 
of the couple's three-year-old daughter. 178 Fifteen months later her 
former husband, the child's father, sought a change in the order and 
an award of custody to him, based on the circumstance that the child's 
mother had begun living with a black man, whom she married two 
months later.179 The Florida court agreed with the father that the 
mother's choice of live-in companion would likely cause the child to 
suffer from "the social stigmatization"180 that would be cast on a ra­
cially mixed household. Accordingly, the court concluded that 
awarding custody to the father would serve the best interest of the 
child. 181 The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 
without opinion. 182 
The Supreme Court agreed that the primary concern shoUld be 
the child's we1fare l83 but forcefully rejected the notion that a court 
could promote that welfare by giving constitutional force and effect to 
private prejudices. 184 Conceding that the child might be subject to "a 
variety of pressures and stress"185 stemming from her mother's inter­
racial marriage, the Court held that "the reality of private biases and 
the possible injury they might inflict are [not] permissible considera­
174. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). "It would ignore reality to suggest that 
racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have 
been eliminated." Id. at 429. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 430. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 431. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 432. 
185. Id. at 433. 
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tions" on which a state may rely in custody proceedings. 186 The Court 
concluded that "[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, 
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."187 
The Palmore decision is concededly distinguishable from P.B. C. 
in that Palmore involved consideration of race as the primary factor 
in the Sidotis' custody dispute, whereas the issue in P.B. C. is illegiti­
macy. The reasoning underlying the Palmore decision is nevertheless 
applicable to P.B. C. Both classifications have their source in social 
prejudice. In both cases the courts focused their inquiries not on pa­
rental fitness, but on the negative social attitudes attaching to parental 
choices and lifestyles. Mrs. Sidoti lived with a black man; P.B.C. was 
not married to his child's mother. Both situations are met with socie­
tal disfavor which may extend to the child as well as to the adults 
involved. 188 
Under Palmore, therefore, the Massachusetts court cannot rely 
on the prejudice that attaches to illegitimacy as the announced motiva­
tion behind a judicial decision. Because the court's reliance on the 
avoidance of the stigma of illegitimacy gives recognition and effect to 
this form of prejudice, it is constitutionally impermissible. 
Because it is impermissible, the state's interest in promoting the 
legitimacy of its children fails to justify the parental classification that 
burdens a putative father's fundamental right to establish a parent­
child relationship. 
B. Protecting Family Harmony 
In addition to promoting legitimacy, the Massachusetts Supreme 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. In a 1985 California Supreme Court case, Chief Justice Bird discussed whether 
avoiding illegitimacy is a justifiable consideration in judicial decisions. In Michelle W. v. 
Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 54, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985). Michelle Marie W. v. 
Riley, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986), a putative father then married to the child's 
mother sought to have himself declared the child's father. The court held that because the 
mother was married to another man at the time of the child's birth, the former husband 
was conclusively presumed to be the child's father. Id. The claiming father, despite the 
fact that he was now married to the mother and living with her and the child as a family· 
unit, was not permitted to rebut the presumption of paternity in the mother's first husband. 
The court was thus able to preserve the legitimacy of the child. Id. 
In a strong dissent, Chief Justice Bird "expressly disapprove[d] the cases which have 
cited avoidance of the stigma of illegitimacy as a policy consideration ...." Id. at - n.7, 
703 P.2d at 99 n.7, 216 Cal. Rptr., 759-60 n.7 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Justice Bird, analo­
gizing to the Palmore concern of avoiding the stigma of racial prejudice as an impermissible 
judicial consideration, concluded that "private prejudice based on illegitimacy should be 
accorded no greater judicial deference [than that based on race]." Id. 
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Judicial Court cited the state's interest in protecting family harmony 
to support its dismissal of the putative father's paternity action, stating 
that "the Commonwealth has legitimate and strong interests in the 
strengthening and encouragement of family life for the protection and 
care of children." 189 
The family harmony the court wished to protect derives from the 
fact of the marriage itself. Because a paternity suit brought by an out­
sider could destroy the marriage, the court employed the irrebuttable 
presumption to remove that threat. 190 Beyond the initial impact of the 
litigation on the marriage, however, the court implied concern for the 
continuing irritant of the third party father's presence in the couple's 
lives in the exercise of any potential visitation rights191 and extin­
guished the putative father's ability to establish parentage in the inter­
est of removing this continuing threat. 192 
Neither of these aims survives a strict scrutiny analysis. Protect­
ing the family from the initial disruption of litigation seems particu­
larly unjustified in light of the facts of P.B. c., in which the mother and 
husband had been married, divorced, and remarried before the litiga­
tion ever began. 193 Conceding that "appropriate social policy might 
be clearer if the marriage had been uninterrupted since the child was 
conceived,"194 the court nevertheless chose to extinguish the putative 
father's claim for the sake of a policy muddied by the past instability 
of the marriage. 
As to the potential for discord that may inhere in continued con­
tact between the newly established family unit and the outsider father, 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court has declared in another context that 
that problem is not compelling enough to justify depriving a natural 
father of a relationship with his child. 195 In In re Carson, the court 
denied an adoption petition by a mother and her third husband where 
the father, the mother's first husband, intervened in opposition to the 
189. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097 (quoting MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 1 (West Supp. 1985». 
190. Id. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098. 
19l. Id. The court's concern for family harmony implies a desire to protect not only 
the family unit as a whole, but also the married couple whose relationship forms the basis 
of the family. Protecting the marital unit as the foundation of the family is a logical way of 
protecting the family structure. 
192. Id. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99. 
193. Id. at 70-71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. 
194. Id. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
195. In re Carson, 6 Mass. App. 665, 382 N.E.2d 1116 (1978), affd., 378 Mass. 793, 
389 N.E.2d 90 (1979). 
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adoption. 196 Although the mother, her third husband, and the child 
lived together as a family unit while the father was an "outsider" to 
that unit, the court insisted that any awkwardness or discomfort to the 
child, and thereby to the family, caused by the persistent presence of a 
former husband did not outweigh the father's right to associate with 
his child. 197 The court held that a father's right to associate with his 
child should not be severed absent a showing of unfitness. 198 This was 
especially true when the absence of a parent-child relationship was due 
to the mother's conduct. 199 
For the court in Carson, therefore, the goal of protecting family 
harmony was not sufficiently compelling to justify excluding a natural 
parent from developing a parent-child relationship. Because the state 
cannot subordinate a father's interest in a parent-child relationship to 
the goal of enhancing family harmony, the state's interest in protecting 
family harmony is not sufficiently compelling to support its classifica­
tion of fathers. 
The court in Carson was concerned that a father's ability to 
achieve a relationship with his child should not tum on whether the 
child and its mother constitute part of a family unit which does not 
include the father. These concerns were likewise important to the 
P.B. C. court. Although it is undeniable that granting a putative father 
the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy and establish his pa­
ternity would require the family to make adjustments to the presence 
of multiple father figures, Carson demonstrates that the burden of diffi­
cult family adjustments does not outweigh a father's interest in know­
ing his child. 
C. Ensuring Care and Support of Children 
The third state interest identified by the supreme judicial court to 
support its decision is that of ensuring care and support of children.2°O 
The state's interest in making fathers responsible for their children 
clearly is compelling. Through its parens patriae power,201 the state is 
196. [d. at 667, 382 N.E.2d at 1117-18. 
197. [d. at 669, 382 N.E.2d at 1118-19. 
198. [d. at 669, 382 N.E.2d at 1119. 
199. [d. at 669, 382 N.E.2d at 1119. 
200. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097. 
201. Massachusetts has a compelling interest in assuring the protection of children 
from abuse or other maltreatment. See. e.g.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 18A, §§ 1-2 
(West 1981 & Supp. 1985) (establishing Department of Youth Services and a program of 
delinquency prevention); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 18B, § 2 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985) 
(Department of Social Services to provide protective services for children); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 18B, § 6A (West Supp. 1985) (foster care review unit established); MASS. 
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responsible for ensuring that children will receive the support they re­
quire, that fathers will be held accountable for the children they sire, 
and that the state will not be burdened by the support of children. 
The presumption of legitimacy, made irrebuttable as to the plain­
tiffin P.B.C., together with the statutory and common law framework 
of parental rights in Massachusetts, does not, however, advance this 
compelling state interest. Refusing to hear the putative father's claim, 
whereby a caring and willing man offers to shoulder the responsibility 
for his alleged child's financial support and offers to participate in the 
care and upbringing of his child, does not ensure support for the child. 
Indeed, the supreme judicial court's decision could actually inter­
fere with the state's interest in ensuring care and support of children. 
The following scenario illustrates this potential danger. The defendant 
mother's husband, who was not a party to this proceeding, could bring 
a future action to adjudicate the paternity of this child.202 If he is then 
excluded as the father and excused from the obligation to support the 
child, the child would be left without any legal father. The putative 
father could conceivably be of unknown whereabouts without knowl­
edge of such a turn of events, or he may at that point be unwilling to 
come forward to assert paternity. Massachusetts could then find itself 
in the peculiar position of initiating paternity proceedings against a 
putative father whose claim of paternity it had refused to hear.203 
The state's interest in this area is not confined, however, to the 
mere assurance that children are supported, but rather includes the 
policy that they be supported by those appropriately responsible for 
them. In Symonds v. Symonds,204 a case involving a divorce and an 
accompanying denial of paternity by the husband, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court stressed that, "[a] married man should have 
no duty to support a child born to his wife during their marriage but 
fathered by another man, any more than a wife should have a duty to 
GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 111, § 186B (West 1981) (the sale of flammable sleepwear for children 
prohibited); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1985) (providing for tem­
porary custody of a minor child who is abused by a household member); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 29A, 29B (West Supp. 1985) (prohibiting the use of children as 
subjects in pornography and the distribution of such matter). 
202. See supra notes 15-16. The law presumes that a husband is the father of a child 
born to his wife. Thus, he is legally recognized as the father until he rebuts the presump­
tion pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 6 (West SUpp. 1985). 
203. Massachusetts courts have interpreted MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 12 
as permitting the state to initiate paternity proceedings. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Lobo, 
385 Mass. 436, 432 N.E.2d 496,503 (1982) ("Massachusetts may bring a complaint initiat­
ing proceedings for paternity, because the statutory scheme protects the interests of the 
state as well as those of the illegitimate child. "). 
204. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, 432 N.E.2d 700 (1982). 
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support a child fathered by her husband during their marriage but 
born of another woman."205 By refusing to adjudicate paternity in 
P.R. c., thereby anchoring the duty of support not to a proven rela­
tionship to the child, but rather to a marital relationship with the 
mother, the supreme judicial court has completly abandoned the pol­
icy announced in Symonds. Not only may the child end up without 
any paternal support, but also, even if the husband does remain in­
volved, the child may be receiving support from one who is not actu­
ally responsible for that support. 
The P.R. C. rule, operating within the scheme of Massachusetts 
paternity law, thereby works to deny a putative father the opportunity 
to support the child he claims as his. The rule imposes the support 
obligation on a man whose only proven relationship is to his wife. The 
presumption of legitimacy, made irrebuttable as to putative fathers, 
promotes neither the state goal of ensuring that minor children are 
supported nor the judicially enunciated policy of attaching the duty of 
support to the man who actually fathered the child. 
Because the state's interest in promoting legitimacy is constitu­
tionally impermissible; its interest in protecting family harmony is 
neither compelling nor, in light of the facts of P.R. c., served by the 
classification; and its interest in ensuring care and support of children 
is actually hindered by the classification, the classification does not 
survive a strict scrutiny analysis. Thwarting a putative father's ability 
to establish his paternity is thus an unconstitutional infringement of 
his rights. 
VI. RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP ANALYSIS OF THE 

MASSACHUSETTS CLASSIFICATION 

If the reviewing court does not deem the interest of a putative 
father in establishing his paternity a fundamental right, then it must 
apply a rational relationship test, rather than strict scrutiny, to the 
classification. The rational relationship standard of review provides 
that if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state inter­
est, the court should defer to the legislative judgment and uphold the 
205. Id. at 544, 432 N.E.2d at 703. See also Lobo, 385 Mass. at 446, 432 N.E.2d at 
502 ("The support and maintenance of children should be shared by those responsible for 
bringing them into the world."). The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reached the same 
conclusion, finding "no justification or morality in a rule which tends to absolve the rightful 
father of his duty of support, while imposing such an obligation upon an innocent husband 
merely because of his marital relationship." Commonwealth ex reI. Savruk v. Derby, 235 
Pa. Super. 560, 564, 344 A.2d 624, 627 (1975) (quoting Commonwealth ex reI. Leider v. 
Leider, 210 Pa. Super. 433, 442, 233 A.2d 917, 921 (1967) (Hoffman, J., dissenting). 
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challenged state action.206 
A. Traditional Rational Basis Review 
Under this general rule of minimum level scrutiny, the Supreme 
Court has often adopted a deferential approach, particularly in the 
area of exclusively economic regulation. In Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
Oklahoma opticians raised an equal protection challenge to the valid­
ity of a law that distinguished between opticians and sellers of ready­
to-wear glasses, subjecting the former, but not the latter, group to reg­
ulations prior to the fitting of eyeglasses.207 The trial court, after care­
ful consideration of the record, concluded that the law was 
unconstitutional because the means were "neither reasonably neces­
sary nor reasonably related" to the state purpose of regulating the vis­
ual health care of the public. 208 
The Supreme Court reversed, declaring that "[t]he prohibition of 
the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious classifi­
cation."209 The Court admitted that the law might "exact a needless, 
wasteful requirement in many cases," but nonetheless chose to defer to 
the legislative judgment, announcing that 
[i]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages 
and disadvantages. . . . The day is gone when this Court uses the 
Due Process Clause [to] strike down state laws, regulatory of busi­
ness and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvi­
dent, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.210 
B. Rational Basis Review "With Bite" 
Although the Court has demonstrated extreme deference to legis­
lative judgment in the area of economic regulation, rational basis 
206. In City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-55 
(1985), the Court described the "general rule" of equal protection analysis, absent implica­
tion of a fundamental right or involvement of a suspect class, in the following terms: 
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sus­
tained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest. When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protec­
tion Clause allows the states wide latitude, and the constitution presumes that 
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process. 
For application of this general rule of rational basis, see, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 
221 (1981); United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Vance 
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
207. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 484-85 (1955). 
208. Id. at 486. 
209. Id. at 489. 
210. Id. at 487-88 (emphasis added). 
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analysis does not always mean automatic deference. In recent years, 
legal scholars and at least some members of the Court have begun to 
express dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the traditional two-tiered 
equal protection system, whereby classifications affecting fundamental 
rights or suspect classes are virtually always struck down via the appli­
cation of strict scrutiny, while other classifications, particularly in the 
economic sphere, are almost always upheld under a rational basis 
analysis. 
Justice Marshall has been the most vociferous member of the 
Court in criticizing the two-tiered system, recommending that it be 
replaced with a more fluid approach. In his dissent in San Antonio 
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, a case involving the constitutionality of 
the Texas system of school financing, based on local property taxes 
and resulting in disparities between richer and poorer districts, Justice 
Marshall suggested that a "principled reading" of the Court's deci­
sions reveals that it has not treated equal protection claims merely as 
either strict scrutiny or rational basis cases.2l1 Rather, the Court "has 
applied a spectrum of standards" to decide equal protection cases.212 
In Justice Marshall's opinion, where a particular case lies on that spec­
trum should depend on "the constitutional and societal importance of 
the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the 
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn."213 
Constitutional scholars have also noted the blurring of sharp di­
viding lines between the levels of the strict, two-tiered system. Profes­
sor Gunther, for exam pie, argues that the Court has begun to blur the 
traditional distinctions between strict scrutiny and rational basis by 
adding "bite" to the lower level of scrutiny.214 This rational basis 
"with bite" approach has enabled the Court to strike down some laws 
that burden neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class. 
Several cases serve to illustrate this developing "bite" to rational 
basis scrutiny. By examining the reasons why the Court chose to do 
more than simply defer to the legislative judgment in those cases, this 
part of the note will demonstrate how the application of a more in­
211. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 589-90 (11th ed. 1985). Professor Gun­
ther comments that, "for the first time in years, old equal protection standards occasionally 
mean something other than perfunctory opinions sustaining the law under attack. Occa­
sionally, moreover, reformulations of 'mere rationality' standards hint at increased bite to 
the scrutiny." Id. at 590. 
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tense rational basis analysis is equally appropriate in the case of a pu­
tative father's right to establish paternity. 
In the area of illegitimacy, for example, the Court has dealt with 
attacks on state statutes that evidenced a preference for legitimate over 
illegitimate children.2ls Although the Court has never considered ille­
gitimate children a suspect class, it has consistently accorded laws that 
affect them more than deferential, "toothless" scrutiny.216 For exam­
ple, in Trimble v. Gordon the Court struck down a statute that barred 
intestate succession by illegitimate children from natural fathers, even 
in the presence of an adjudication ofpaternity.217 The Court carefully 
considered the state's interest at stake, that of promoting legitimacy, 
and concluded that that interest was not significant enough to justify 
the classification.2ls Even under a rational basis test, the Court ex­
plained, "the Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere 
incantation of a proper state purpose."219 Because Trimble involved a 
legally disadvantaged group of people who needed special judicial pro­
tection and because the classification impacted on substantive rights, 
the Court chose to look very closely at the validity of the statute.220 
This was a marked departure from the Court's posture of virtually 
215. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 
762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 68 (1968). 
216. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767. 
217. Id. at 776. 
218. Id. at 768-69. 
219. Id. at 769. 
220. Trimble is one in a line of cases in which the Supreme Court examined classifi­
cations based on illegitimacy. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the Court struck 
down a state law which made wrongful death damages available to legitimate, but not 
illegitimate, children upon the death of their mothers. Four years later, in Weber v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court refused to permit the claims of dependent 
unacknowledged illegitimate children to be subordinated to the claims of legitimate chil­
dren under a workers' compensation law. 
In other cases, the Supreme Court continued to demonstrate that while illegitimacy 
was not to be considered a suspect classification, and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny, 
the rational basis analysis that was appropriate would not be "toothless." For example, in 
Mathews, 427 U.S. 495, the Court held that in claims for Social Security benefits for depen­
dent children, it was permissible to presume dependency in the case of legitimate children 
while requiring illegitimate children to prove dependency. The court explained that "per­
haps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this 
discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of 
the historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes." Id. at 506. 
Accordingly, the Court has struck down state laws which exclude illegitimate children 
from a right to paternal support, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), and which impose 
restrictive statute of limitations requirements on paternity suits brought for the purposes of 
identifying and obtaining support from unwed fathers, Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 
(1982); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983). 
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automatic deference in Lee Optical.221 
Rational basis "with bite" is further illustrated in the case of Lo­
gan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., in which the Court held unconstitu­
tional a statute extinguishing employment discrimination claims that 
were not processed within a designated amount of time.222 The plain­
tiff had raised both procedural due process and equal protection chal­
lenges to the statute. The Court's opinion rested on procedural due 
process grounds, but four justices found the equal protection claim 
"sufficiently important" to write a separate opinion invalidating the 
statute under equal protection.223 
The Illinois law at issue in Logan required that a hearing take 
place within 120 days of the filing of an employment discrimination 
claim.224 The agency that handled the claims inadvertently scheduled 
plaintiff's hearing for a date five days after the statutory period and 
was thus deprived of jurisdiction over the claim.22s The justices who 
considered plaintiff's equal protection claim, conceding its "unconven­
tional" nature, nonetheless found that the statute created a classifica­
tion whereby one class of claims-those processed within 120 days­
would be preserved, while another class-those not processed within 
120 days-would be extinguished.226 Emphasizing that the "rational­
basis standard is 'not a toothless one,' "227 the justices evaluated the 
state's interests at hand-eradicating employment discrimination and 
discouraging false claims against employers-and found that the clas­
sification did not rationally advance those interests.228 
While the justices professed to be doing no more than applying 
mere rational basis scrutiny, at least one commentator has noted the 
"unusual" nature of the Court's approach to the case.229 Justice 
Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion for the Court striking 
down the Illinois law on procedural due process grounds, nevertheless 
took the additional step of sUbmitting a separate opinion in which he 
221. See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text. 
222. Logan, 455 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1982). 
223. Justice Blackmun authored the separate opinion, with which Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and O'Connor joined. Id. at 438-42. 
224. Logan, 455 U.S. at 424. 
225. Id. at 426-27. 
226. The Court explained that Logan was an "unconventional" equal protection case 
because the statute contained no classification on its face. The effect of the statute, how­
ever, was to divide claims into two groups and treat each group differently and in that way 
the statute triggered equal protection. Id. at 438-39. 
227. [d. at 439 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976». 
228. Logan, 455 U.S. at 427. 
229. G. GUNTHER, supra note 53, at 619. 
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pointed out that the statute would also fail under equal protection.230 
Justice Blackmun and the three justices who joined in this separate 
opinion found that the equal protection issue, while unnecessary to the 
decision, was so important that it merited discussion. Applying the 
least rigorous intensity of judicial review, Justice Blackmun found that 
the statute failed to withstand constitutional attack.231 In a concur­
ring opinion, Justice Powell urged a narrow decision yet agreed that 
the statute did not meet even the minimum rationality test. 232 The 
striking aspect of the Court's disposition of Logan, therefore, is its 
willingness to put "bite" into the lowest level of scrutiny and to invali­
date a law under an equal protection analysis of the least intensity. 
Most recently, the Court has signaled its inclination to apply ra­
tionality "with bite" in a case involving the rights of mentally retarded 
people to live in residential communities. In City ofCleburne, Tex. v. 
Cleburne Living Center, the Court considered a zoning regulation 
aimed at preventing the establishment of a group home in a residential 
neighborhood.233 The Court refused to find that mentally retarded 
people constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class but was concerned 
enough about the rights of mentally retarded people to strike down the 
law nonetheless.234 
The Court, upon careful review of the record, concluded that it 
did not "reveal any rational basis for believing that the [group] home 
would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests,"235 and 
that the zoning ordinance appeared to rest on no more than "an irra­
tional prejudice against the mentally retarded. "236 
Such cases as Trimble, Logan, and Cleburne establish that auto­
matic deference is not the only alternative under the rational basis tier 
of analysis under the equal protection clause. When the Court per­
ceives a case close to triggering strict scrutiny, it will pay particular 
attention to the state's interests and the ways in which the state action 
advances those interests. This note asserts that the right of putative 
230. Logan, 455 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). 
231. Id. at 439. 
232. Id. at 443-44 (Powell, J., concurring). 
233. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). 
234. Id. at 3255-56. 
235. Id. at 3259. 
236. Id. at 3260. Despite its searching review of the record and subsequent invalida­
tion of the ordinance, the Court insisted that it was only following established rational basis 
doctrine. The dissenters questioned this, stating that the ordinance "surely would be valid 
under the traditional rational basis test" and suggesting that the Court actually was apply­
ing a heightened level of review. Id. at 3263 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). 
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fathers to establish paternity is just the kind of "close" case in which 
application of rational basis "with bite" is appropriate. 
In Trimble, Logan, and Cleburne, the Court found neither sus­
pect classes nor fundamental rights, but something about the status of 
illegitimate children, workers alleging discrimination, and mentally re­
tarded people compelled the Court to consider carefully their claims. 
That something special, this note asserts, is the proximity of such 
groups and their rights to suspect class or fundamental right status. 
The cases merit heightened review because, in Justice Marshall's 
words, their interests are of particular "constitutional and societal im­
portance." The Constitution and society have traditionally accorded 
the utmost protection to children, workers suffering from discrimina­
tion, and mentally retarded people. On the other hand, the purely 
economic interests of such groups as opticians are not considered of 
particular import, and thus the Court has had no trouble deferring to 
the legislative judgment in those cases.237 
Putative fathers and their interests in establishing paternity are 
more like the groups and interests protected in Trimble, Logan, and 
Cleburne than they are like those interests at stake in the cases in 
which the Court has found it easy to defer. Even if establishing pater­
nity is not a fundamental right, it is closer to a fundamental right than 
to a purely economic interest. The interest of a putative father in 
proving that he is the father of a child implicates human values, family 
values, and privacy values-all values that society and the Constitu­
tion have historically found significant. Like Trimble, Logan, and 
Cleburne, P.B. C is just the kind of close case in which the Court must 
do more than simply defer. 
When carefully considering the interests of Massachusetts in dis­
allowing a putative father to prove paternity, the Court will look at 
factors similar to those discussed in Part V of this note. 238 For the 
same reasons that the irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy does not 
survive strict scrutiny, it will also not satisfy a rational basis "with 
bite" analysis. In essence, Massachusetts has failed to demonstrate a 
rational relationship between disallowing a putative father's attempts 
to prove paternity and the state's goals of ensuring support for chil­
dren or protecting family harmony; nor has it established the validity 
of a policy of preferring legitimacy over illegitimacy. For these rea­
sons, the state's denial of a putative father's attempt to prove paternity 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 207-210. 
238. See supra text accompanying notes 167-205. 
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must be struck down under the appropriate level of rational basis 
review. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A putative father's right to establish paternity is a fundamental 
right. Because Massachusetts classifies fathers in such a way as to bur­
den that right, without state interests sufficient to overcome that bur­
den under either a strict scrutiny or a rational basis analysis, the 
classification scheme is unconstitutional. The presumption of legiti­
macy may therefore not constitutionally stand in the way of a putative 
father's efforts to prove that he is the father of a child. 
When a married woman conceives and bears the child of a man 
who, though not her husband, is willing to shoulder the responsibili­
ties of fatherhood, the court should not apply a rigid presumption of 
paternity in the mother's husband to foreclose the putative father's 
opportunity to establish paternity. The application of that presump­
tion both violates the putative father's constitutional right to equal 
protection and severely undercuts the newly emerging role of men as 
full and equal parents in our society. 
Susan J. Barnes 
